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Induced Infringement as a Strict




A patent confers upon the holder a monopoly right to exclude
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the patented
invention.' Whoever without authority conducts such activities
directly infringes the patent.2 Direct infringement is a strict liability
claim; it occurs regardless of the infringer's intention or knowledge.3
The strict liability scheme for direct infringement ensures that a
patent holder gains the full economic rewards of their invention,
which constitutes a sufficient market-driven incentive for inventors to
invest in making new products.4
This strict liability scheme was maintained even after the
Supreme Court expanded the scope of direct infringement by
adopting the doctrine of equivalents. The doctrine allows a court to
hold a party liable for patent infringement when the infringing
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1. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1996).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
3. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
645 (1999) ("Actions predicated on direct patent infringement.... do not require any
showing of intent to infringe; instead, knowledge and intent are considered only with
respect to damages.").
4. ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 133-34 (5th ed. 2010).
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product or process does not fall within the literal scope of patent
claims, but nevertheless performs "substantially the same function in
substantially the same way to obtain the same result" as the patented
invention The key question of the doctrine of equivalents is whether
the allegedly infringing product or process contains elements identical
or equivalent to each claimed element of the patented invention.6 The
rationale for this doctrine is to prevent an "unscrupulous copyist"
from making insubstantial substitutions in the patent that would be
enough to avoid the literal scope of the patent claims.7 However, the
actual application of the doctrine has nothing to do with the
"unscrupulousness" of the infringer.8 Thus, a party who sells
substantially identical products as the patented article may be liable
for patent infringement regardless of whether the party deliberately
avoids literal infringement or even whether the party in fact knows of
the patent. The doctrine of equivalents has never deviated from the
strict liability scheme of patent law.
Patent law has again expanded the scope of infringement by
recognizing that one who does not by himself produce the same or an
equivalent invention may nevertheless be held liable as an indirect
infringer. Through the 1952 Patent Act, Congress codified the
indirect infringement doctrine in 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) and (c). 9 Section
271(b) provides: "Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent
shall be liable as an infringer." Section 271(c) provides:
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or
imports into the United States a component of a patented
machine, manufacture, combination, or composition, or a
material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process,
constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same
to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an
infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing
use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
Both of those two forms of indirect infringement, i.e., induced
infringement and contributory infringement, require the accused
5. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 335 U.S. 605,608 (1950).
6. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17,40 (1997).
7. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607.
8. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 41("Application of the doctrine of
equivalents.., is akin to determining literal infringement, and neither requires proof of
intent.... [I]ntent plays no role in the application of the doctrine of equivalents.").
9. Hereinafter, §271(b) and §271(c) refer to 35 U.S.C. §271(b) and (c),
respectively.
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infringer to somehow lead another to engage in direct infringement.' °
Most of indirect infringement claims arise when a manufacturer sells
products which do not by themselves directly infringe a patent, but
which may be used by purchasers or end-users to directly infringe the
patent." If the number of purchasers/end-users is large and each
instance of direct infringement is only on a small scale, it is
impractical and inefficient for the patent holder to file multiple
lawsuits against all individual direct infringers 2  The indirect
infringement doctrine resolves that problem by allowing the patent
holder to enjoin the one who sells the troublesome products which
result in direct infringement. 3
Contrary to the doctrine of equivalents, the indirect infringement
doctrine has diverged from the strict liability scheme. Contributory
infringement of § 271(c) requires that the violator knows its product
is especially and exclusively adapted for use in an infringement of the
patent. Induced infringement in § 271(b) does not expressly mention
any knowledge or intent of the inducer, but lower courts nevertheless
have consistently required a certain level of specific intent of the
inducer. 4 Further, the Supreme Court recently held that the
knowledge of the relevant patent is needed under § 271(b) and that
"willful blindness" may also satisfy the knowledge requirement. 5
This Note argues that the specific intent requirement for § 271(b)
should be abolished. The language of § 271(b) does not provide any
textual supports for the specific intent requirement. Additionally, the
10. Courts hold that both induced infringement and contributory infringement
require the existence of direct infringement. See, e.g., RF Del., Inc. v. Pac. Keystone Tech.,
Inc., 326 F.3d 1255, 1268, (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("[L]iability for either active inducement of
infringement or for contributory infringement is dependent upon the existence of direct
infringement...."); Epcon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., 279 F.3d 1022, 1033
(Fed. Cir. 2002) ("It is well settled that there can be no inducement of infringement
without direct infringement by some party .... A finding of contributory infringement
likewise requires underlying proof of direct infringement.").
11. Charles W. Adams, Indirect Infringement from a Tort Law Perspective, 42 U.
RICH. L. REV. 635,650 (2008).
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712, 721 (6th Cir.
1897) ("Many of the most valuable patents are combinations of nonpatentable elements,
and the only effective mode of preventing infringement is by suits against those who, by
furnishing the parts which distinguish the combination, make it possible for others to
assemble and use the combination .... "); Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement,
39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 225, 228 (2005).
14. DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 17.04[2] (2010).
15. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068-69 (2011).
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specific intent requirement is contrary to the early development of
the case law before the enactment of the 1952 Patent Act, which put
no emphasis on the mental state of a defendant. It is also in conflict
with many aspects of patent law including the utilitarian policies, the
doctrine of equivalents and the basic risk allocation. Nor does the
overlapping scope of § 271(b) and § 271(c) necessitate the specific
intent requirement because Congress intended the generic language
of § 271(b) to cover a broader scope of indirect infringement than the
specific situation of § 271(c). Instead, induced infringement under
§ 271(b) should be considered as a strict liability claim. The tort
principles of strict product liability and vicarious liability support
strict liability on induced infringement with overlapping policy
considerations.
The proximate causation analysis of tort law better fits the
induced infringement doctrine than the specific intent requirement.
The text of § 271(b) expressly indicates a causation element, which in
turn necessitates proximate causation analysis. Proximate causation
does not thwart the strict liability scheme of patent law and thereby
avoids the doctrinal and practical problems of the current specific
intent requirement. The extensive case law of tort law regarding
proximate causation analysis benefits parties, courts and
practitioners. Proximate causation analysis is flexible enough to
safeguard against over-expansion of the scope of inducement.
Part II will summarize courts' decisions and commentators'
opinions regarding the specific intent element of induced
infringement. Part III will refute current arguments suggested in
support of the specific intent requirement and then justify a strict
liability for induced infringement. Part IV will discuss the validity of
proximate causation analysis in the context of induced infringement.
II. Various Specific Intent Tests for Induced Infringement
A. Intra-Circuit Splits in Federal Circuit Court Decisions
Before the Supreme Court's Global-Tech decision, the Federal
Circuit had articulated numerous inconsistent standards for the
specific intent element of induced infringement. Initially, in Hewlett-
Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., the Federal Circuit required the
plaintiff to show "proof of actual intent to cause the acts which
constitute the infringement.', 16 The standard of Hewlett-Packard is a
16. 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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fairly low hurdle because it only requires that the defendant intended
to induce the acts later held to constitute infringement.1 7 But in
Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc., the Federal Circuit
required proof the defendant possessed "specific intent to encourage
another's infringement," and thus the plaintiff had the burden of
showing the defendant's actions "induced infringing acts and the
defendant knew or should have known his actions would induce
actual infringement."' 8 The standard of Manville is higher than that of
Hewlett-Packard in that the patent holder needed to show the
defendant knew of the patent and actually had intended to induce
violation of the law.19
Sixteen years later, in DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., the
Federal Circuit dealt with this conflict and upheld en banc the higher
standard of Manville, holding that inducement requires, "that the
alleged infringer knowingly induced infringement and possessed
specific intent to encourage another's infringement.., not merely
that the inducer had knowledge of the direct infringer's activities." 20
However, in SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., the Federal
Circuit qualified the holding of DSU as having decided "the target of
the knowledge, not the nature of that knowledge," and delivered a
ruling that "deliberate indifference of a known risk" was sufficient to
satisfy the actual knowledge requirement. 2' The court once again
22
obscured the scope of the intent element, and finally in 2011, the
Supreme Court stepped in to address this issue.
B. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.'3
The Supreme Court in Global-Tech held that induced
infringement under § 271(b) requires knowledge that the induced acts
constitute patent infringement.24 The Court explained § 271(b)
implies a knowledge element but the text of § 271(b) and the relevant
17. Lemley, supra note 13, at 238.
18. 917 F.2d 544, 552 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
19. Lemley, supra note 13, at 240.
20. 471 F.3d 1293, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en bane as to "Section III.B").
21. 594 F.3d 1360, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (upheld but with a different specific intent
standard in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011)).
22. See, e.g., Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.: Brief Amici Curiae of 26
Law, Economics, and Business Professors in Support of Petitioners, 2010 WL 3019717
(2010).
23. 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011).
24. Id. at 2068.
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pre-1952 cases are unclear on whether § 271(b) merely require that
the inducer lead another to engage in conduct that happens to
amount to infringement or that the inducer must persuade another to
engage in conduct that the inducer knows is infringement. 2 However,
the Court determined that Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co.26 resolved the question by holding that a violator of
§ 271(c) must know that the combination for which his component
was especially designed was both patented and infringing.27 The Court
then decided that there is no reason to treat § 271(b) differently and
thus § 271(b) requires knowledge of the relevant patent as well. 8
Further, the Court adopted the doctrine of "willful blindness"
from criminal law.29 This doctrine holds that defendants cannot negate
knowledge or willfulness by deliberately shielding themselves from
clear evidence of critical facts that are strongly suggested by the
circumstances.' Willful blindness requires: (1) the defendant must
subjectively believe that there is a high probability that a fact exists
and (2) the defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning
of that fact.3 The "deliberate indifference" test of the Federal Circuit
is erroneous in that it permits a finding of knowledge where there is
merely a known risk that the induced acts are infringing and it does
not require active efforts by an inducer to avoid knowing about the
infringing nature of the activities.
In summary, the Court in Global-Tech required two steps of
knowledge. First, the inducer must know about the action he wishes
to bring about from another.33 The Court finds its support from the
combination of the terms "induce" and "actively" in § 271(b)."
Second, the inducer must know that the action constitutes
infringement of the relevant patent.35 The Court finds its support from
25. Id. at 2065-67.
26. 377 U.S. 476 (1964).
27. Id. at 2067-68.
28. Id. at 2068.
29. Id. at 2068-69.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2070.
32. Id. at 2071.
33. Id. at 2065 (When a person actively induces another to take some action, the
inducer obviously knows the action that he or she wishes to bring about.).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2068.
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Aro JJ.36 The "willful blindness" doctrine is relevant to the second
knowledge requirement.37
C. Commentators' Suggestions
Commentators have articulated various specific intent standards
for induced infringement. Mr. Rader supports the Hewlett-Packard
standard.38 He provides three justifications: (1) the Manville standard
results in uneven patent protection across different industries, (2) the
Hewlett-Packard standard maintains the distinction between
infringement and willful infringement, and (3) the Hewlett-Packard
standard effectively imposes a risk of personal liability on corporate
officers and thus results in a favorable settlement for patent holders.39
Professor Lemley suggests a "sliding scale" approach which a
defendant's act and intent interact with each other in a way that the
more significant the defendant's conduct, the less intent should be
required for liability.0 If the defendant causes infringement, his
knowledge of the acts caused may satisfy the intent requirement,
whereas if the defendant merely assists infringement, intent to
infringement patent is further required.4' Professor Lemley tries to
avoid "letting the mastermind escape," but at the same time
acknowledges that it is unreasonable to hold a mere facilitator liable
in a case where he did not in fact know that the act he was
41
encouraging was wrong.
Professor Holbrook agrees with the Manville standard and
argues that an inducer should be liable only when he intended to
induce patent infringement.43 He explains that truly culpable parties
are those who intend to induce patent infringement and not those
who simply intend to induce the acts that happen to constitute
44infringement. He is concerned that other lower standards may
36. Id. at 2067-68.
37. Id. at 2068-69.
38. Michael N. Rader, Toward a Coherent Law of Inducement to Infringe; Why the
Federal Circuit Should Adopt the Hewlett-Packard Standard for Intent Under § 271 (b), 10
Fed. Circuit B.J. 299, 301 (2000).
39. Id. at 330-333.
40. Lemley, supra note 13, at 242.
41. Id. at 244.
42. Id. at 242-43.
43. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Intent Element of Induced Infringement, 22 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 399, 408-409 (2006).
44. Id. at 408.
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involve anti-competitive consequences by affording an exceedingly
powerful tool to patent owners.
Professor Oswald goes in the opposite direction by questioning
why a direct infringer without any knowledge of the patent should
nevertheless be held strictly liable, while an indirect infringer without
direct encouragement should escape liability.46 She emphasizes
judicial economy and allocation of the risk of loss, and argues that a
specific intent requirement such as the Manville standard may
undermine the congressional intent inherent in the strict liability
regime of direct infringement .
Professor Rantanen proposes an objective risk-based approach
similar to the tort concept of objective recklessness.48 The test asks
whether a high risk of infringing a valid patent would have been
obvious to a person in the accused party's position. 9 Professor
Rantanen argues that this new approach enables an optimal
adjustment of the deterrence effects of the inducement doctrine and
that it is the normative standard actually being applied in practice."
He notes that a similar object risk-based analysis has already been
adopted in the context of willful infringement.
III. Refuting the Argument for the Specific Intent Requirement
Although courts and commentators debate on the precise
standard of the specific intent for induced infringement under
§ 271(b), the majority agree that induced infringement requires at
least some specific intent of the inducer.52 They have justified
imposing a specific intent requirement through the following four
45. Id. at 409.
46. Lynda J. Oswald, 21st Century Copyright Law in the Digital Domain Symposium:
Symposium Article: The Intent Element of "Inducement to Infringe" under Patent Law:
Reflections on Grokster, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 225,241-42 (2006).
47. Id. at 243-46.
48. Jason A. Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault in Patent Infringement, 60 Am.
U.L. Rev. 1575, 1625-33 (2011).
49. Id. at 1622-23.
50. Id. at 1625-32.
51. Id. at 1607-09.
52. Professor Oswald deviates from this general tendency by emphasizing
discrepancies between the strict liability regime of direct infringement and the specific
intent requirement (such as the one in Manville) of induced infringement. Oswald, supra
note 46, at 245. However, it is unclear whether she proposes abolishment of the entire
specific intent element from the induced infringement doctrine. See id. at 243 (arguing for
an objective standard evaluating what the defendant knew or should have known).
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arguments: (1) the text of § 271(b) implies a specific intent
requirement,53 (2) the historical origin of the induced infringement
doctrine mandates a specific intent of the inducer,54 (3) the structural
relationship between § 271(b) and § 271(c) implies a specific intent
requirement for § 271(b),55 and (4) policy considerations protecting
innocent parties and avoiding over-deterrence of innocent acts or
anticompetitive consequences necessitate a specific intent
requirement.56
This Note argues that none of those four arguments sufficiently
justify the a specific intent requirement for induced infringement, and
argues for a strict liability claim for induced infringement.
A. The Text of § 271(b)
Section 271(b) provides: "Whoever actively induces infringement
of a patent shall be liable as an infringer." The Supreme Court began
its analysis in Global-Tech by stating "[a]lthough the text of § 271(b)
makes no mention of intent, we infer that at least some intent is
required."57 However, in Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, the
Court held that "courts must presume that a legislature says in a
statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there."58 It is
questionable whether Global-Tech's "inference" of an intent element,
which has been done beyond the text of § 271(b), is consistent with
the "cardinal canon" of Connecticut National Bank.59
In any case, the text of § 271(b) does not provide any room for
such inference. The statute does not mention "purposeful
inducement," "intentional inducement" or "knowing inducement"-it
mentions "active inducement." In the common understanding around
the time of 1952, "induce" means "1. To lead on; to influence; to
53. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2065 (2011)
("Although the text of § 271(b) makes no mention of intent, we infer that at least some
intent is required."); Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo electron Co., Ltd., 248 F.3d 1376, 1378-79 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) ("Of course inducement has connotations of active steps knowingly taken-
knowingly at least in the sense of purposeful, intentional as distinguished from accidental
or inadvertent.").
54. Lemley, supra note 13, at 235.
55. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068; Holbrook, supra note 43, at 408; Global-Tech
Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.: Brief Amici Curiae of 26 Law, Economics, and Business
Professors in Support of Petitioners, 2010 WL 3019717 (2010).
56. Holbrook, supra note 43, at 408-410; Rantanen, supra note 48, at 1625.
57. 131 S. Ct. at 2065.
58. 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992).
59. Id. at 253.
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prevail on; to move by persuasion or influence .... 3. To bring on or
about; to effect; cause; as, a fever induced by fatigue or exposure.""
The scope of the term "inducement" is not necessarily limited to a
purposeful, intentional or knowing stimulation but encompasses a
wide range of non-intentional activities which influence or cause
another to act. Further, if the Global-Tech Court inferred a
knowledge element from the term "induce, 61 such inference is not in
harmony with another federal statute. 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) provides: "It
shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in
price which is prohibited by this section."62 It implies that Congress
understands the term "induce" does not have a knowledge element
because otherwise the term "knowingly" becomes redundant.63
Nor does the term "actively" contain any specific intent element.
The word "actively" means "[i]n an active manner; with activity" 6
and it must limit the term "induce." With that understanding,
"[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a patent" in § 271(b) can
be converted to "whoever induces infringement of a patent in an
active manner" or "whoever induces infringement of a patent with
activity," which indicates that the term "actively" distinguishes
between acts of commission and acts of omission, not between mental
states. Combined with the term "induce," the term "actively" serves a
role in eliminating causative omissions from the scope of § 271(b).65
The Supreme Court in Global-Tech then appealed to
commonsense and asserted that "[w]hen a person actively induces
another to take some action, the inducer obviously knows the action
that he or she wishes to bring about."66 Again, it is a matter of
interpretation of the terms "actively" and "induce." As discussed
60. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1269 (2d ed. 1956) (emphasis in
the original).
61. 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2065 (2011).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (emphasis added).
63. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 68 (1994) (holding that
courts should "give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute, avoiding, if it
may be, any construction which implies that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of
the language it employed.").
64. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 27 (2d ed. 1956). Further, the
term "active" does not have any intent component either. Id.
65. In this regard, the Court in Global-Tech correctly mentions that "[t]he addition of
the adverb 'actively' suggests that the inducement must involve the taking of affirmative
steps to bring about the desired result." 131 S. Ct at 2065.
66. 131 S. Ct. at 2065.
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above, neither of the terms connotes any intent component such as
the knowledge element which the Court asserts. The Court's
subsequent analysis on whether the inducer must know of the patent
is a byproduct of this wrong premise.
B. The Historic Origin of § 271(b)
The early principle of contributory infringement, which
encompasses the current concept of both induced infringement and
contributory infringement, originated from the tort law of aiding and
abetting.67 Aiding and abetting occurs when a defendant provides
substantial assistance or encouragement to another's tortious
conduct6 with specific intent to further the other's wrongdoing.69
Probably because of the doctrinal origin, early courts discussing
contributory infringement frequently used terms indicating a specific
intent such as "intent," "purpose" or "knowledge" with regard to the
accused party.7° However, the precise meaning of such "intent,"
''purpose" or "knowledge" in the context of contributory
infringement has been unclear, and more importantly, such a specific
intent became a mere legal fiction and invisible as the contributory
infringement doctrine evolved away from the historical origin.
Wallace v. Holmes" is the earliest case in which someone other
than direct infringers was found liable for patent infringement. The
67. See Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712, 721 (6th Cir.
1897) ("An infringement of a patent is a tort analogous to trespass or trespass on the case.
From the earliest times, all who take part in a trespass, either by actual participation
therein or by aiding and abetting it, have been held to be jointly and severally liable for
the injury inflicted."); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469
(Fed. Cir. 1990) ("liability was under a theory of joint tortfeasance, wherein one who
intentionally caused, or aided and abetted, the commission of a tort by another was jointly
and severally liable with the primary tortfeasor .... "); Chisum, supra note 14, § 17.02.
68. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 (1979).
69. Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 268 (2000) (explaining United States v.
Lewis, 628 F.2d 1276 (10th Cir. 1980), "this defendant knowingly engaged in the acts of
using force and taking money (satisfying 'general intent'), he did not intend permanently
to deprive the bank of its possession of the money (failing to satisfy 'specific intent')").
70. E.g., New York Scaffolding Co. v. Whitney, 224 F. 452, 459 (8th Cir. 1915) ("One
who makes and sells articles which are only adapted to be used in a patented combination
will be presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts .. "); Henry v. A.B. Dick
Co., 224 U.S. 1, 49 (1912) ("The fair interpretation of the facts stated is that the sale was
with the purpose and intent that it would be so used."); Alabastine v. Payne, 27 F. 559, 560
(C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1886) ("In selling a compound which he knows cannot be practically
applied without making the user a trespasser, the defendant ... renders himself an
accessory to the infringement.").
71. 29 F. Cas. 74 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871).
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patent at issue in Wallace was for a lamp containing a particular
burner and a particular chimney. The burner without the chimney,
or the chimney without the burner, was "utterly useless."73 The
defendants sold burners which were substantially the same as the
burner used in the patent.74 They advertised and displayed their
burner furnished with the chimney of the patented invention in their
sales room, but they did not sell any chimneys.75 Instead, chimneys
were produced and sold by a third party, and purchasers of both the
burner and the chimney could combine them and produce the
patented lamp.76 The Connecticut District Court held the defendants
were "joint infringers" with the "express purpose" of assisting patent
infringement, based on the joint-tortfeasor theory of tort law.77 The
court explained:
The defendants have not, perhaps, made an actual pre-
arrangement with any particular person to supply the chimney
to be added to the burner; but, every sale they make is a
proposal to the purchaser to do this, and his purchase is a
consent with the defendants that he will do it, or cause it to be
done. The defendants are, therefore, active parties to the whole
infringement, consenting and acting to that end, manufacturing
and selling for that purpose.
Wallace is considered to be the origin of the contributory
infringement doctrine. The doctrinal basis of the contributory
infringement liability was the tort liability in a concerted action of
joint-tortfeasors, and the concerted action was found in an implicit
proposal/consent inherent in the sale and advertisement of non-staple
articles.79 With this rationale, the "express purpose" was not merely
the mental state of the accused infringer, but was an overt purpose
involving some affirmative actions, such as advertisement of non-
72. Id. at 79.




77. Id. at 80.
78. Id.
79. In tort law, acting in concert does not require an explicit agreement or conspiracy.
An implicit agreement with subsequent actions according to the agreement is enough. For
example, if two defendants race their automobiles and one injures plaintiff, both
defendants are jointly and severally liable because they act in concert. Bierczynski v.
Rogers, 239 A.2d 218 (Del. Super. Ct. 1968).
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staple articles for their infringing use, which stimulates buyers to
engage in an infringement.
Later, courts tried to relax or even abolish Wallace's "express
purpose" requirement when a defendant sells non-staple articles. In
Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., the defendant sold
switches and trollies that had no practical utility except in an electric
street railway covered by the patent at issue.80 The catalogue of
products merely described their utility, but not their infringing
capacity.8' The Sixth Circuit held the defendant liable for contributory
infringement because the defendant, in offering for sale to the general
public the switch and trolley specifically adapted for the patented
system, was "legally presumed to intend the natural consequences of
his act. ' 82 Therefore, in Ohio-Brass, the sale of a non-staple article
constituted substantially prima facie evidence of contributory
infringement and the intent or knowledge of the defendant was
imputed to the non-staple nature of the article. Other courts similarly
found contributory infringement by presuming intent based on the
non-staple nature of products the defendant sold.83
When a defendant sold staple articles of commerce, courts rarely
found any contributory infringement liability on the defendant. In
Saxe v. Hammond, the patent at issue was for a tremolo attachment
for musical instruments.8 The defendant manufactured and sold fans
capable of revolving and the patent holder argued that the defendant
infringed on their patents claims because the revolving fans were
capable of infringement if they were combined with musical
instruments in a certain position and arrangement.85 The revolving
80. 80 F. 712,720 (6th Cir. 1897).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 721.
83. E.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Kerotest Mfg. Co., 81 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1935) ("The
defendant is a manufacturer of devices for effecting the same functional objects as do the
patents in suit," and thus "if their device infringes, they are contributory infringers, for the
proofs show they have continuously been selling their devices to the oil well trade since
Oct., 1931."); Thomson-Houston Electr. Co. v. Kelsey Electr. R. Specialty Co., 75 F. 1005
(2d Cir. 1896) (the lower court issued an injunction holding that "the defendant was selling
stands capable of, and designed for, an unlawful use, and that, inasmuch as they are useful
only for the purpose of performing functions involved in the operation of the patent, there
was a presumption of an intention that these stands should be so used, which was not
dispelled by the affidavits," and the appellate court did not reject the holding but modified
the injunction to exclude replacement and substitution of broken trolley stands).
84. 21 F. Cas. 593, 594 (C.C.D. Mass. 1875).
85. Id.
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fans themselves were neither new nor patented articles, however. 6
The Massachusetts Circuit Court rejected the infringement claim
distinguishing the instant case from Wallace. The court explained:
The gist of the decision in [Wallace] was, that the actual concert
of the makers of the different elements in the combination, was
a certain inference from the facts in that case, and the distinct
efforts of the defendants, to bring into use those elements of the
combination which comprised the whole invention, although
they could not be used without adding one other element, were
found to be proved. No such state of facts is proved in this case,
as has already been shown .... As defendants only make one
element of the patented invention, in order to hold them guilty,
I must find proof connecting them with the infringement.
Different parties may all infringe, by respectively making or
selling, each of them, one of the elements of a patented
combination, provided those separate elements are made for
the purpose, and with the intent, of their being combined by a
party having no right to combine them. But the mere
manufacture of a separate element of a patented combination,
unless such manufacture be proved to have been conducted for
the purpose, and with the intent of aiding infringement, is not,
in and of itself, infringement. A patent is valid for a new
combination of old elements. A person who uses one or more of
the old elements is not an infringer, unless he uses the new
combination.88
Saxe is significant because the court made it clear that when a
patent is for a new combination of known elements, a person who
uses one or more of the known elements cannot be an infringer unless
he uses the entire new combination. The defendant in Saxe sold
articles that had already been in the public domain, whereas the
defendant in Wallace sold novel articles specifically adapted to the
patented product. While the court in Saxe confirmed the manufacture
of one element of a patented combination may constitute
contributory infringement if the production is coupled with the
purpose and intent of aiding infringement, at the same time suggests
that a defendant who manufactures a non-novel article is not an
infringer regardless of his purpose or intent unless he uses the patent
combination as a whole. In other words, Saxe seems to consider the
non-novel nature of the articles the defendant sold as an irrefutable
defense against the contributory infringement claim.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. (emphasis added).
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Three years after Saxe, the same court was faced with another
contributory infringement case, Bowker v. Dows.s9 In Bowker, the
patent at issue was for combining saponine extract with liquids
containing carbonic acid gas in order to stabilize foams.9° The facts are
not clear as to whether the saponine extract was novel.9' The patentee
sued the defendant who made and sold an extract containing
saponine.92 The court did not present detailed facts, but stated that
"the defendant sells an extract containing saponine to persons who
intended to use it in the combination claimed in the patent, and it is
advertised and sold for that very purpose., 93 The court held the sale
constituted infringement of the patent, explaining that although the
manufacture and sale of the saponine extract would not, without
more, be an infringement, the law must not exonerate the defendant
who made and sold the extract "for the express and avowed purpose
of its use in the combination." 94
The exact scope of the Bowker decision remains unclear due to
the uncertainty of its facts.95 If the Bowker court meant that the sale
of staple articles with express purpose may constitute contributory
infringement, it is inconsistent with the rule of Saxe which the same
court had articulated three years earlier. The Bowker decision instead
seems to follow the logic of Wallace, which dealt with a sale of non-
staple articles.96 It is notable that the court put emphasis on express
and avowed purpose rather than the mere inner mental state of the
defendant. The express and avowed purpose requirement requires
some activities (advertising, etc.) that stimulate another's infringing
activity; it is more akin to an act requirement, not a specific intent
requirement. As discussed above, later cases relaxed or abolished the
89. 3 F. Cas. 1070 (C.C.D. Mass. 1878).
90. Id. at 1071.
91. Some commentators presume that the court knew the saponine extract had other
non-infringing uses. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 11, at 652; Rantanen, supra note 48, 1597
note 122. But the court in Bowker did not expressly mention any non-infringing uses,
which obscures the scope of the decision. It is possible that the court considered the
saponine extract novel or that the lawyer for the plaintiff did not show non-infringing uses.
92. 3 F. Cas. at 1071.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See note 94.
96. In fact, the Bowker decision did not distinguish the case from Wallace. 3 F. Cas at
1071.
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express purpose requirement, and they imputed the purpose
requirement to the sale of non-staple articles.'
Some courts denied contributory infringement even when a
defendant sold his products with knowledge that the use of the
products would cause infringement, which weakens the argument that
the historic origin of § 271(b) necessitates infringers' knowledge of
infringement. For example, in Chas. H. Lilly Co. v. I.F. Laucks, Inc.,
the patent at issue was for a certain type of glue that used soya bean
flour or meal as a base.98 The defendant manufactured and sold soya
bean flour which had a variety of non-infringing uses. 9 On at least
one occasion, the defendant solicited interest from a glue
manufacturer.'O The court, however, held that "soya bean meal and
soya bean flour are standard articles of commerce; and being such a
sale thereof may not be enjoined."'' 1 A similar holding is found in
Individual Drinking Cup Co. v. Errett.'° The patent at issue was for a
machine for dispensing paper drinking cups and each defendant sold
dispensing machines or cups, but not both. 3 Both dispensing
machines and cups had non-infringing uses.'° The Second Circuit
held: "Where ... any paper cup of proper size is available for the
purposes of the infringing device.., the mere sale or use of the paper
cup ... with the knowledge that the same was to be used in a
patented machine, cannot charge the vendor of the cup... with
contributory infringement. . . ."0'
Early decisions of the Supreme Court imputed the intention of
defendants to the non-staple nature of their products. In American
Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, the plaintiff owned patents for
improvements in metallic cotton bale ties, each tie consisting of a
buckle and a band, and sold the ties with the words "Licensed to use
97. See Thomson-Houston Electr. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712 (6th Cir. 1897);
Travers v. Beyer, 26 F. 450 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1886); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Kerotest Mfg.
Co., 81 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1935); Thomson-Houston Electr. Co. v. Kelsey Electr. R.
Specialty Co., 75 F. 1005 (2d Cir. 1896). Those cases were discussed above.
98. 68 F.2d 175, 176 (9th Cir. 1933).
99. Id. at 189.
100. Id. at 180.
101. Id.
102. 297 F. 733 (2d Cir. 1924).
103. Id. at 735.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 740.
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once only" stamped in the metal of the buckle. 1' The defendants
reconstructed and sold the metal ties for cotton bales.'°7 The
defendants contended that they did not infringe the patents because
they did not bale cotton with the ties.' The Court rejected the
contention.' ° Relying on both Saxe and Bowker, the Court explained
that because the defendants prepared and sold the tie, which would
not have been made or sold without the bale cotton, they intended it
to be used to bale cotton and to produce the results set forth in the
patents, thus infringed on them." ° Also, in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co.,
the plaintiff sold his patented mimeograph machine to a third party,
with a license restriction that all ink be bought from the plaintiff."'
The defendant sold ink directly targeting the third party who
purchased the machine from the plaintiff."2 The Court held the act of
defendant constituted contributory infringement."' The Court
explained:
Undoubtedly a bare supposition that by a sale of an article
which, though adapted to an infringing use, is also adapted to
other and lawful uses, is not enough to make the seller a
contributory infringer.... There must be an intent and purpose
that the article sold will be so used. Such a presumption arises
when the article so sold is only adapted to an infringing use.
[citation omitted] It may also be inferred where its most
conspicuous use is one which will co-operate in an infringement
when sale to such user is invoked by advertisement. [citation
omitted]. "4
In summary, the early case law of the contributory infringement
doctrine, which encompasses the current indirect infringement
doctrines of both inducement and contributory infringement,
diverged from the original tort principle by vitiating the specific intent
requirement."5 Courts did not place much emphasis on the inner
106. 106 U.S. 89, 90-91 (1882).
107. Id. at 94.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 94-95.
111. 224 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1912).
112. Id. at50.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 49 (emphasis added).
115. Such divergence may be due to fundamental inconsistencies between the specific
intent requirement and the rationale behind the contributory infringement doctrine.
Detailed discussion will follow in Subpart B.
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mental state of a defendant; the key was the nature of the activity the
defendant engaged in, especially, the nature of the products the
defendant sold. If the products were specially adapted to an infringing
use, courts found the defendant liable for contributory infringement
no matter what the defendant knew or intended. On the other hand,
if the products had substantial non-infringing uses, courts exonerated
the defendant even if the defendant knew his products would cause
infringement.116
Congress codified § 271(b) acknowledging and adopting the case
law development of the contributory infringement before the
enactment of the 1952 Patent Act.1 7 In the pre-1952 case law, the
knowledge or intent of the defendant was merely a legal fiction which
had nothing to do with the actual mental state of the defendant.
Overemphasis on the specific intent requirement is, therefore,
contrary to the historical background of § 271(b).
C. Relationship between § 271(b) and § 271(c)
Section 271(b) provides that whoever actively induces
infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer. Section 271(c)
imposes contributory infringement liability on a party who sells a
component constituting "a material part" of a patented invention
which is "not a staple article or commodity of commerce" on the
condition that the party knows the component is "especially made or
especially adapted for use in an infringement" of the patent. Thus,
§ 271(b) defines the prohibited activity using general terms of
"actively induces," whereas § 271(c) narrowly specifies the prohibited
activity by the nature of the product sold and the knowledge of the
seller. Relying on the statutory structure, the Supreme Court and
commentators found two somewhat different justifications for a
specific intent requirement of induced infringement. The first one,
which the Supreme Court adopted in Global-Tech, is that because the
two provisions have a common origin in the pre-1952 understanding
of contributory infringement, the knowledge requirement of § 271(c)
116. Some commentators regard Bowker as a representative case which held a seller of
staple articles liable for contributory infringement. See Rantanen, supra note 48, at 1597,
note 122. As discussed above, however, the factual uncertainty seriously undermines its
significance.
117. The relevant legislative history acknowledged and adopted the case law
developed before the enactment of the 1952 Patent Act. S. Rep. No. 32-1979, at 8 (1952);
H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 9 (1952) ("The doctrine of contributory infringement has been
part of our law for about 80 years.... The purpose of this section is to codify in statutory
form principles of contributory infringement....").
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is also applicable to § 271(b). s18 The second one, which some
commentators rely on, is that the broader scope of § 271(b) should be
counterbalanced by a stricter intent requirement in order not to
render § 271(c) superfluous. " 9 However, as discussed below, neither
of them is persuasive given the legislative history and the purposes of
the two provisions.
We first consider the legislative history. Section 271(b) and
§ 271(c) were intended as complementary provisions, together
codifying the previously developed case law on contributory
infringement. 12' The Senate and House Reports on the 1952 Act
explain that § 271(b) "recites in broad terms" the early principles of
contributory infringement, and that § 271(c) more concerns "the
usual situation in which contributory infringement arises," which is
"much more restricted than many proponents of contributory
infringement believe should be the case."'' Thus, § 271(b) with its
broad terms covers the entire scope of early contributory
infringement doctrine and § 271(c) provides a "usual" and
"restricted" situation of such broadly defined contributory
infringement. It must be noted that a contributory infringer defined in
§ 271(c) is presumed to have specific intent or express purpose to
cause another's infringement under the pre-1952 case law because he
sells products which are specially adapted to a patent infringement.'
That is, contributory infringement of § 271(c) always satisfies the
requirements of induced infringement of § 271(b), but the opposite is
not true, which means that § 271(b) has more relaxed requirements
than those of § 271(c).'23 It follows that the knowledge requirement of
118. 131 S. Ct. at 2068.
119. See Holbrook, supra note 43, at 408; Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.:
Brief Amici Curiae of 26 Law, Economics, and Business Professors in Support of
Petitioners, 2010 WL 3019717 (2010).
120. Chisum, supra note 14, § 17.04[3]; Jervis B. Webb Co. v. Southern Sys. Inc., 495 F.
Supp. 145, 146 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Electronic Memories &
Magnetics Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1262, 1265 n.9 (D. Mass. 1978).
121. S. Rep. No. 32-1979, at 8 (1952); H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 9 (1952) (emphasis
added).
122. See, e.g., Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712 (6th Cir.
1897); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Kerotest Mfg. Co., 81 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1935);
Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Precise Mfg. Corp., 11 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1926). Those
cases were discussed in Subpart A.
123. Rantanen, supra note 48, at 1625, note 271 (arguing that contributory
infringement can be viewed as a narrower but more clearly defined subset of induced
infringement).
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§ 271(c) does not necessitate any similar or higher specific intent
requirement for § 271(b).
It is fair to regard that Congress intended to codify § 271(b)
broadly so as to subsume the entire scope of § 271(c). The broadness
of § 271(b) does not necessarily render § 271(c) meaningless,
however.'24 Contributory infringement is found if (1) a party offers to
sell or sells (2) a material component of a patented invention (3)
knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use
in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use.' 25
Such specific requirements produce more predictable and reliable
results than § 271(b). Practically it is beneficial to the judicial system
because it saves judicial resources by promoting settlements between
parties and discouraging non-meritorious lawsuits. It is also beneficial
to parties because they are able to accurately assess the benefit and
risk of litigations.
Therefore, the structure of § 271(b) and § 271(c) does not
necessitate any specific intent requirement in § 271(b). The relevant
legislative history undermines a specific intent requirement because
§ 271(b) was codified to broadly cover the entire scope of the early
contributory infringement doctrine, whereas § 271(c) was to provide
specific guidance for the most common type of contributory
infringement. The broader scope of § 271(b) does not render § 271(c)
useless because the specific language of § 271(c) provides practical
benefits by producing more predictable and reliable results than
§ 271(b).
D. Policy Considerations
Some commentators use a specific intent requirement in order to
limit an over-expansion of the scope of induced infringement.
Professor Lemley asserts that where a party merely helps or assists
but does not actually cause another's infringement, it makes little
sense to hold the party liable if the party did not in fact know that the
act the party was encouraging was wrong.26 Professor Holbrook is
concerned that a low specific intend threshold would penalize a good
actor and create a chilling effect on competition, which in turn raises
124. Professor Rantanen analogize the relationship between § 271(b) and § 271(c) to
the relationship between an independent claim and a dependent claim, which the former
does not render the latter superfluous. ld; see also, Chisum, supra note 14, § 17.04[3].
125. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
126. Lemley, supra note 13, at 242-43.
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product prices.1 27 Professor Rantanen argues that too low of a fault
standard would over-deter lawful, productive conduct and impose
excessive information costs on potential infringers.'28
Those concerns are valid in the sense that a patent holder's right
must be limited in some way so as not to be misused against innocent
competitors. The question this Note poses, however, is why a specific
intent requirement, which is not even expressly mentioned in the text
of § 271(b), is considered to be the only solution for this problem.
Anti-competitive consequences or over-deterrence may be avoided
by adequately limiting the scope of induced infringement, and a
specific intent requirement is not the only way of doing that.29
Arguments justifying a specific intent requirement rely on a premise
that inducement liability without such a specific intent requirement
necessarily results in unreasonable liabilities on innocent parties.'30
Such reasoning is inherently circular because it presumes that a party
without an intent or knowledge of causing infringement is innocent
and that inducement liability on that party is necessarily
unreasonable. Patent law is grounded on a different policy rationale
from that of tort law or criminal law and thus the culpability of a
certain party should be determined differently than in those areas of
law. In this regard, the specific intent requirement is inconsistent with
many important concepts in patent law.
First, the specific intent requirement is inconsistent with the
utilitarian considerations, which underlie patent law. Drafters of
patent law chose to give an exclusive right to a patent holder and
impose strict liability on infringers... in order to maximize economic
benefits to the patent holder who contributed to society with a useful
invention.' But over-protection of the patent right is as bad as under-
protection because it burdens free use of publicly disclosed ideas
upon which either no patent is obtained or patent protection has
127. Holbrook, supra note 43, at 408-09.
128. Rantanen, supra note 48, at 1626.
129. This Note proposes the proximate causation analysis as an alternative. A detailed
discussion is in Part IV.
130. E.g., Lemley, supra note 13, at 243 (arguing that it is unreasonable to hold mere
facilitators liable if they did not in fact know that the act they were encouraging was
wrong); Holbrook, supra note 43, at 408 (arguing that truly culpable parties are those that
intend to induce infringement and that to hold otherwise would penalize a "good" actor
who holds a belief that the others are not directly infringing).
131. See 35 U.S.C. §§154(a)(l) and 271(a).
132. Merges, supra note 4, at 133.
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expired.'33 The specific intent requirement, however, has nothing to
do with the guarantee of free use of publicly disclosed ideas. Whether
a certain technology is within the public domain or not is subject to an
objective comparison of the technology and other patented
technologies. A specific intent requirement simply does not fit the
objective comparison.
Second, the specific intent requirement is also in tension with the
strict liability scheme of the Doctrine of Equivalents. The Doctrine of
Equivalents and the induced infringement doctrine are the same in
that they both expand the scope of infringement, but their current
applications are in sharp contrast. Although courts adopted the
doctrine of equivalents in order to deter an "unscrupulous copyist,"'
14
the actual application of the doctrine has nothing to do with the
unscrupulousness of the infringer. 135 It only concerns an objective
comparison of a patented invention and an alleged infringing
product.136 On the contrary, the rationale behind the induced
infringement doctrine is to give a patent holder the most effective
remedy against infringing activities, 37 but the actual imposition of
inducement liability depends on the mental state of a defendant."3 As
a result, it exonerates a party who is completely careless and it
imposes the burden of such inadvertent inducement on the patent
holder.39
Conceptually, the specific intent requirement matches the
doctrine of equivalents, which is to meant deter unscrupulous
copyists, as opposed to the inducement doctrine, which is to provide
effective protection for patent holders. If expansion of the scope of
liability is troublesome, and it needs to be limited by using the specific
intent requirement, there is no reason to distinguish the doctrine of
equivalents and leave it out from the imposition of a specific intent
requirement. But courts chose to maintain the doctrine of equivalents
133. See Bonito Boats Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 164-65 (1989).
134. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 335 U.S. 605,607 (1950).
135. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997)
("Application of the doctrine of equivalents.., is akin to determining literal infringement,
and neither requires proof of intent.... [lintent plays no role in the application of the
doctrine of equivalents.").
136. The test is whether the potentially infringing product or process contains elements
identical or equivalent to each claimed element of the patented invention. ld. at 41.
137. Lemley, supra note 13, at 228.
138. Chisum, supra note 14, § 17.04[2].
139. If a defendant is completely careless, it does not satisfy "willful blindness" of
Global-Tech. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070 (2011).
[Vol. 4:2
INDUCED INFRINGEMENT AS STRICT LIABILITY
in the realm of strict liability, which tells us that they view the costs of
extending liability as acceptable in light of the economic objectives
and utilitarian benefits of patent law. Strict liability inducement is less
objectionable and less costly than the strict liability requirement from
the doctrine of equivalent in terms of cost of investigating and
determining what activities infringe. In this sense, the doctrine of
equivalents and the induced infringement doctrine are currently
incoherent.
Third, the specific intent requirement is in a sharp tension with
the basic risk allocation of patent law. Consider the following
example: Patentee A has a patent for a cancer drug containing 10
mg/g or more of Compound X. Compound X is not a novel
compound and has been used as an effective component for treating
diabetes. Seller B, who does not know of A's patent, sells a cancer
drug containing 15 mg/g of Compound X. On the other hand, Seller C
knows of A's patent and tries to mimic the invention, but because of
fear of patent infringement liability, he produces a cancer drug
containing only 9 mg/g of Compound X. In such circumstances, under
current patent law Seller B is liable for infringement but Seller C is
not (assuming 9 mg/g is not equivalent to 10 mg/g or more). This is
true even though Seller C is in some sense more mentally culpable
than Seller B. This is a fundamental policy choice expressed in our
patent laws that allocate the loss of inadvertent infringement on
market participants. "0 Current patent law thus imposes an obligation
on market participants to search relevant patents and to design
around them.'41 In the above example, Seller B did not fulfill his
obligation to search relevant patents, and thus patent law punishes
him. Seller C on the contrary fulfilled the obligation and thus is off
the hook regardless of his intention.
Now consider another example. Seller D, who does not know of
A's patent, sells highly purified Compound X thinking it would be
used for producing a diabetes drug. Seller E knows of A's patent and
sells purified Compound X, and he simultaneously advertises that his
product can be used in copying the patented cancer drug. Almost all
direct infringers use Seller D's purified Compound X because it is
more pure; only a few direct infringers actually use Seller E's product.
Current patent law holds Seller E liable for induced infringement but
140. See Oswald, supra note 46, at 244.
141. It may be unpractical to obligate market participants to search each and every
relevant patent. See Lemley, supra note 13, at 235-36. But the risk of injury should fall on a
defendant, not on a patent holder. See Oswald, supra note 46, at 244-45.
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will exonerate Seller D because Seller D did not have any specific
intent.42 It puts market participants in a position where they need to
research all relevant patents that their products might directly
infringe but not any patents that their products might induce
infringement.14 When faced with a patent, however, they cannot
determine how the patent is related to their products until they
analyze it, and consequently, they are caught in a situation that is a
catch-22. They must decide whether to analyze it or not. This result
seriously vitiates the fundamental principle of patent law that
obligates market participants to search relevant patents.
In that sense, the concerns of excessive product prices and
information costs, which Professor Holbrook1'  and Professor
Rantanen raise,"' are insignificant if not unreal. The strict liability
scheme of direct infringement imposes on market participants an
obligation to search for patents that are relevant in anyway. Market
participants cannot distinguish direct-infringement-related patents
from inducement-related patents until they search and analyze all of
those patents. It is questionable how much cost a specific intent
requirement could reduce market participants' burden. Sophisticated
market participants, who are major targets of induced infringement
claims, have already used a lot of resources in searching and analyzing
patents in the relevant field. Imposition of an obligation to search
another set of inducement-related patents would not significantly
increase production/information costs.
E. Justifications for Strict Liability for Induced Infringement
The current induced infringement doctrine exonerates a party
who inadvertently causes another to infringe a patent. If the patent
holder is unable to sue the direct infringer, the burden of loss
142. Seller D's advertisement will easily prove the required knowledge under Global-
Tech because D advertised his or her product can copy the patented drug. On the other
hand, Seller E's mental state does not amount to willful blindness because E did not
subjectively believe that there is a high probability of patent infringement nor did E take
any deliberate actions to avoid learning of the infringement. See Global-Tech Appliances,
Inc. v. SEB S.A.131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070 (2011).
143. In this regard, mere deliberate ignorance of a patent does not likely satisfy the
"willful blindness" threshold of Global-Tech because it does not amount to subjective
belief of a high probability of infringement.
144. Holbrook, supra note 43, at 408-09.
145. Rantanen, supra note 48, at 1626.
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incurred by such infringement is on the patent holder.146 On the other
hand, strict liability for induced infringement shifts the burden to the
party who inadvertently and indirectly causes another's infringement.
Thus, the key issue here is determining which party should bear the
burden of loss. This Note argues that induced infringement should be
subject to strict liability-and the burden of loss should be on the
party that causes the infringement, not on the patent holder. Strict
product liability theory and the vicarious liability theory provide
doctrinal supports for strict liability for induced infringement.
First, the strict product liability theory of tort law justifies the
strict liability scheme for induced infringement. Tort law imposes
strict liability on a seller if the defect in his product causes damage to
a buyer.147 The seller is liable even when he did not know of the defect
in his product or even when he exercised every reasonable precaution
to ensure the safety of the product. The injured buyer can recover
damages from the seller if he proves that the product was in fact
defective, such defect existed when the product left the seller's
control, and the defect was the proximate cause of the injury
sustained.4 " The Minnesota Supreme Court adopted such strict
product liability based on the following four policy considerations: (1)
the public interest in safety will be promoted by discouraging the
marketing of defective products; (2) the burden of loss caused by
placing a defective product on the market should be borne by the
manufacturer, the party who is best able to distribute the risk by
insuring against inevitable hazards, as a part of the cost of the
product; (3) maximum legal protection should be afforded the
consumer to promote product safety; and (4) one injured by a
146. See, e.g., Holbrook, supra note 43, at 408 (arguing the contributory infringement
doctrine should not create a windfall for patentees against innocent parties).
147. Restatement (Second) Torts § 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the
seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to
and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition
in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised
all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or
consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual
relation with the seller.
Restatement (Second) Torts § 402A (1979).
148. Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321, 329 (1971).
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defective product should be entitled to bring action directly against
the party responsible for putting the product on the market."'
The policy considerations suggested by Minnesota Supreme
Court have equal force in induced infringement of patent law. Most
inducement cases involve the sale of products that are capable of an
infringing use. An inducer puts his product into the stream of
commerce and a direct infringer buys the product and uses it for an
infringing activity, which in turn causes harm to the patent holder. If
we analogize the infringing use of the product to a "defect" in the
product,50 the public interest in protecting the patent holder's
intellectual property right will be promoted by discouraging the sale
of such "defective" products (policy (1) above). The seller of such a
product is in the best position to balance the benefit created by the
product with the cost of potential induced infringement liability
(policy (2) above). The patent holder should be able to enjoy
maximum legal protection of his monopoly right (policy (3) above),
and thus he should be entitled to bring an action directly against the
party responsible for putting the product on the market (policy (4)
above).
It is noticeable that such policy considerations substantially
overlap with the rationales behind the induced infringement doctrine.
Both strict product liability and inducement liability guarantee
maximum legal protection for an injured party by enabling him to sue
the seller of the product that resulted in the injury. They both allocate
the burden of loss to the seller who attains financial benefits by
bringing the product into the stream of commerce.
An induced infringement case may factually be different from
usual strict product liability cases in that the buyer of the infringing
product is a direct infringer who inflicts damages on the patent
holder, whereas in a strict product liability case, the buyer of the
product suffers damages caused by the product. But such a difference
does not significantly weaken any of the policy considerations
discussed above. Most importantly, in both induced infringement and
strict product liability, the seller of the product who financially
benefits from the sale of it is in the best position to absorb the
149. Id. at 327-28.
150. The strict product liability acknowledges three types of defects: manufacturing
defect, design defect and warning defect. JOHN L. DIAMOND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS, 531 (2d ed. 2001). An infringing use of a product may be analogized to a design
defect since it is an error in its design or blueprint. It may as well be a warning defect if the
product does not contain enough warnings to avoid possible patent infringements.
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damages caused by the product. There may be cases where an
infringing use of the product is insubstantial and direct infringement
should be imputed mostly to the direct infringer's independent
activity. In such cases, proximate causation analysis, especially the
superseding intervening force exception, will adequately limit induced
infringement liability. The detailed discussion will follow in Part IV.
The vicarious liability theory may be another basis for the strict
induced infringement liability. In certain situations, courts hold a
defendant vicariously liable for another's wrongdoing without finding
any scienter in the defendant.' It commonly occurs where an
employer is held vicariously liable for the wrongdoing of its employee
acting within the scope of his employment.152 Such vicarious liability,
or respondeat superior, is strict liability imposed on the employer for
the employee's torts, and thus the employer is liable even when he
exercised every possible precaution during hiring or supervising the
employee."3 The older rationale justifying vicarious liability was that
the employer has control of the employee and should be responsible
for his torts, but it is largely supplanted by notions that the
employer's business should be responsible for risks the enterprise
imposes on the community. 5 4 Thus, the current view is that the
employer's liability should extend beyond his actual or possible
control over the employees to include risks inherent in or created by
the enterprise because the employer, rather than the innocent injured
party, is best able to spread the risk through prices, rates or liability
insurance.'
The Federal Circuit in BMC Resource, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P.
56
brought the theory of vicarious liability into patent law, but in an
inaccurate way. The court stated:
[T]he law imposes vicarious liability on a party for the acts of
another in circumstances showing that the liable party
controlled the conduct of the acting party .... In the context of
patent infringement, a defendant cannot... avoid liability for
direct infringement by having someone else carry out one or
more of the claimed steps on its behalf.
15 7
151. Diamond, supra note 150, at 638.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 639.
154. Id. at 638-39.
155. Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 608, 618 (4th Dist. 1975).
156. 498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
157. Id. at 1379 (emphasis added).
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But vicarious liability is a type of secondary liability, which must
be conceptually distinguished from direct infringement liability.58 The
vicarious liability theory better supports induced infringement
liability. The rationales for both vicarious liability and induced
infringement coincide in that they provide an effective protection for
the harmed party by allowing them to sue the party who attains
financial benefits from the activity causing the harm. It is especially
useful in dealing with a case where an inducer does not sell any
product to a direct infringer. For example, if an employer directs his
employee to manufacture infringing products, the employer is strictly
liable for inducement. Or, if a principal contracts with a contractor to
manufacture infringing products and if the principal is closely
involved with the details of the contractor's work, the principal is also
strictly liable for inducement.'59 Both cases squarely fit the term
"actively induces" of § 271(b) and its goal of ensuring effective
protection of patent holders.
The scope of vicarious liability is arguably broader than the
textual meaning of "actively induce" of § 271(b) because the "active
inducement" excludes causative omissions that vicarious liability may
includei 6° I argue that induced infringement of § 271(b) should
encompass all vicarious liability situations as an exception. Such a
broad and relaxed interpretation may be justified by a defendant's
special right and ability to supervise infringing activities and his direct
financial interest in such activities.
158. See MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929-30 (2005) ("When a
widely shared service or product is used to commit infringement, it may be impossible to
enforce rights in the protected work effectively against all direct infringers, the only
practical alternative being to go against the distributor of the copying device for secondary
liability on a theory of contributory or vicarious infringement.").
159. See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. De Forest, 28 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1928); Water
Technologies Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660 (Fed Cir. 1988); Toppan v. Tiffany
Refrigerator Car Co., 39 F. 420 (C.C.N.D. 11. 1889).
160. See Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1569 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
161. The Ninth Circuit found vicarious liability for copyright infringement when the
defendants had control over direct infringers and had a direct financial interest in the
infringing activity. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
(Such a special relationship creates an affirmative duty to prevent infringement, and
breach of that duty may be treated substantially same to unlawful commission in the
meaning of "active inducement.").
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IV. Proximate Causation Analysis for Induced Infringement
One of the most serious concerns about imposing strict liability
on induced infringement will be that the scope of inducement may be
over-expanded and thus may interfere with free trade of 'innocent'
articles. This Note argues that proximate causation analysis,
especially the foreseeability analysis, should substitute the specific
intent requirement. Subpart A will summarize the legal causation
analysis of tort law. Subpart B will justify the legal causation analysis
for induced infringement. Subpart C will discuss an actual application
in induced infringement contexts.
A. Proximate Causation Analysis in Tort Law
In tort law, a plaintiff must show that a defendant's wrongful
conduct is a cause of the harm the plaintiff suffers. The defendant's
wrongful conduct in fact causes the damages if but for the wrongful
conduct, the plaintiff would not have suffered such damages. But the
plaintiff cannot establish the legal causation by merely showing that
the defendant's wrongful conduct is the "but-for cause" of the
damages. Courts also require proof that the wrongful conduct is the
"proximate" cause of the damages. Proximate causation analysis asks
whether the defendant's conduct is too remotely connected to the
damages to fairly impose responsibility on the defendant. '62 This is a
policy-based safeguard against counterintuitive expansion of liability
that would follow from the mechanical but-for analysis.63 In his
famous dissenting opinion of Palsgraf v. The Long Island Railroad
Company, Justice Andrews explained: "What we do mean by the
word "proximate" is, that because of convenience, of public policy, of
a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of
events beyond a certain point. ''4
The most common test for proximate causation is the
foreseeability test, which focuses on whether the damages suffered by
the plaintiff were reasonably foreseeable in light of the defendant's
wrongful conduct. 16 It is not necessary to show that a particular
accident and a particular damage were probable; it is sufficient if the
accident is of a class that might well be anticipated as one of the
162. Diamond, supra note 150, at 238.
163. Id. at 238-39.
164. Palsgraf v. The Long Island Ry. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 352 (1928) (Andrews, J.,
dissenting).
165. H. L.A. HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW, 254 (2d ed. 1985).
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reasonable and probable results of the wrongful act.' 66 In the context
of strict liability, the foreseeability doctrine has been generalized to
risk theory. 67 If a defendant carries on an abnormally dangerous
activity, which is subject to strict liability, the defendant is liable for
any harm within the risk of the activity, i.e., any harm the activity
commonly results in.'6 Thus, a person conducting blasting operations
on his land is liable for damages by flying debris or concussion, which
are within the risks generally inherent in a blasting operation. '69
Proximate causation analysis which encompasses the
foreseeability doctrine (or the risk theory) applies equally to strict
product liability cases.170 Thus, a person selling cologne is liable for
damages caused by combustion because it is foreseeable to the seller
that the cologne, in its normal use, may be brought near a spark or
flame. 7' On the other hand, a manufacturer of a pair of safety glasses
is not liable for a lathe operator's injuries sustained when a severe
blow by a steel bar broke the lens of the safety glasses because that
exceeds what is reasonably foreseeable and what the lens was
designed for.
172
The foreseeability doctrine is limited by the additional
requirement that there be no superseding intervening force.' An
intervening force is one that joins with the defendant's conduct to
cause the injury and that occurs after the defendant's conduct. 7 4 An
intervening force will only act to cut off proximate cause if it is
characterized as superseding.7 5 Superseding intervening forces are
new forces which are extraordinary and unexpected.7 6 The test is
whether the intervening act and the injury resulting from it are of
such a character that the primarily negligent party should have
166. Id. at 257 (citing Haynes v. Harwood [1935] 1 KB 146, 156 per Greer Li; Pollock
38 LQR 165, 167 (1922)).
167. Id. at 286.
168. Id.
169. Whitman Hotel Island R. Co. v. Elliott & Watrous Eng'r Co., 137 Conn. 562
(1951).
170. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability § 15 (1998) ("Whether a product
defect caused harm to persons or property is determined by the prevailing rules and
principles governing causation in tort.").
171. Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 332 A.2d 11 (Md. 1975).
172. American Optical Co. v. Weidenhamer, 457 N.E.2d 181,186 (1983).





reasonably anticipated them in light of the attendant circumstances.
177
It is not necessary that the actor should have contemplated the
particular chain of events that occurred, but only that the injury at the
hand of the intervening party was within the general range of
consequences which any reasonable person might foresee as a natural
and probable consequence of the negligent act.
178
In strict product liability cases, a defendant's intentional misuse
of a product is one type of such superseding intervening force. In
Schwartz v. American Honda Motor Co., the Seventh Circuit applying
Illinois law stated that a plaintiff's conduct can bar relief in a strict
product liability case if his actions constitute a "misuse" that is not
reasonably foreseeable to a reasonably prudent manufacturer.'79 Thus,
a rider of a motorcycle who put his foot to the ground or near the rear
wheel may not be able to recover damages if such use constitutes an
improper use.'8 In Venezia v. Miller Brewing Co., the Eighth Circuit,
applying Massachusetts law, ruled similarly that a manufacturer is not
liable for injuries sustained by an individual coming into contact with
"rough edges" created by his own intentional misuse of an otherwise
"fit" product in a manner in no reasonable way related to the
intended uses of the product.' 8' Thus, neither a brewer nor a
manufacturer were liable for injuries sustained by an eight-year-old
child who threw a beer bottle against a nearby telephone pole,
because such an act is clearly beyond the ordinary use intended for
the productJ 82
B. Justifications for Using Proximate Causation Analysis for Induced
Infringement
Proximate causation analysis, especially the foreseeability
analysis, has benefits over the current specific intent requirement.
First, proximate causation analysis is better supported by the text of
§ 271(b), especially by the terms "actively" and "induces," than the
specific intent element. The dictionary definition of the term "induce"
uses plenty of words to indicate causation, such as "lead on,"
"influence," "bring on or about," "effect," "cause," etc.'83 Its
177. Shepard v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 299 S.C. 370, 375 (S.C.Ct.App. 1989).
178. Id.
179. 710 F.2d 378, 380 (7th Cir. 1983).
180. Id.
181. 626 F.2d 188, 192 (1st Cir. 1980).
182. Id. at 190-91.
183. See WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1269 (2d ed. 1956).
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connotation of causation is much more explicit than that of a specific
intent. Further, the term "actively" better fits causation analysis than
the specific intent determination. The term "actively," in combination
with "induce," effectively excludes causative omissions from the
scope of § 271(b),1'8 whereas the term is foreign in the context of the
specific intent requirement. Given such solid textual supports for the
causation element, proximate causation analysis, which is a necessary
tool for determination of causation, deserves more emphasis than the
non-textual specific intent requirement.
Second, the proximate causation requirement does not thwart
the strict liability scheme of patent law. It instead considers objective
factors which have nothing to do with infringers' knowledge or intent,
and thereby the integrity of the strict liability scheme of patent law
remains intact. It follows that proximate causation requirement can
avoid all the doctrinal and practical problems of the current specific
intent requirement, which are discussed above in Part III.D.
Proximate causation analysis is consistent with the utilitarian
rationales of patent law in that it prohibits activities which result in
infringement and thus ensures patent holders to enjoy the full
economic benefit of their patents, whereas the specific intent
requirement carves out careless inducers' activities from the scope of
protection. It is also consistent with the basic risk allocation in that it
imposes market participants a burden to search relevant patents
which their activities may directly infringe or cause another to
infringe. The specific intent requirement, on the contrary, confuses
market participants by incentivizing them not to read patents which
may implicate them with induced infringement liabilities.
Third, we may borrow the extensive case law for proximate
causation analysis from tort law and thus we do not have to wrestle
with the unique and undefined concept of a specific intent for induced
infringement. Parties will be incentivized to settle their disputes under
the well-defined concept of proximate causation. Courts will save a
significant amount of judicial efforts and resources. Practitioners will
enjoy benefits of having more detailed and extensive case law on the
key issue of induced infringement cases. Suggested applications
follow in Subpart C below.
184. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.131 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2011) ("The
addition of the adverb 'actively' suggests that the inducement must involve the taking of
affirmative steps to bring about the desired result.").
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Fourth, proximate causation analysis properly reflects various
policy considerations,"' which enables an individualized and case-
specific approach for induced infringement. The scope of induced
infringement can thus be properly adapted to industrial
characteristics, technical developments and to societal changes.
Commentators' concerns such as over-deterrence"6 or anti-
competitive consequences ' may be avoided through the flexibility of
proximate causation analysis.
C. Application of Proximate Causation Analysis for Induced
Infringement
Suppose Patentee A has a patent for a pharmaceutical
composition comprising a certain amount of Compound X.
Compound X has a substantial non-infringing use as a component of
a laundry detergent. Seller B sells purified Compound X, and Direct
Infringer C uses B's Compound X in making the patented
pharmaceutical composition without any authorization from Patentee
A. In order to determine whether Seller B's sale of purified
Compound X proximately causes Direct Infringer C's infringement, it
must be determined whether C's infringing activity is a foreseeable
consequence of B's sale of purified Compound X. The following
factors may be taken into account in the foreseeability analysis.
First, the nature of Seller B's product, purified Compound X, will
be an important factor. If purified Compound X was somehow
adapted to an infringing use better than to a non-infringing use, it
may indicate that direct infringement is a foreseeable consequence
resulting from the sale of the product. For example, if Seller B's
Compound X is unnecessarily pure and overly expensive for laundry
detergent uses, and if the high purity of Compound X is better suited
to pharmaceutical uses, then it can be said that the sale of the purified
Compound. X creates a high risk of direct infringement. In such
circumstances, Buyer C's direct infringement may be a foreseeable
consequence of the sale of the purified Compound X, and thus Seller
B may be held liable for inducement.
Braintree Laboratories, Inc. v. Nephro-Tech, Inc.'88 dealt with a
similar situation. The defendant in Braintree sold calcium acetate
185. Palsgraf v. The Long Island Ry. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 352 (1928) (Andrews, J.,
dissenting).
186. Rantanen, supra note 48, at 1626.
187. Holbrook, supra note 43, at 408-9.
188. 81 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (D. Kan. 2000).
SUMMER 20121 INDUCED INFRINGEMENT AS STRICT LIABILITY
414 HASTINGS SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
which had an infringing use of treating kidney dialysis patients as well
as a non-infringing use for calcium supplement.' 9 Calcium acetate was
a "less-than-optimal" choice as a calcium supplement due to the high
levels of the product that would need to be ingested to effect calcium
supplementation.' 90 The Kansas District Court held that such
circumstances could support the jury's conclusion that the product
was actually being marketed for an infringing use.'91 The court
inferred the defendant's specific intent from the sale of the product,
but in the foreseeability analysis such sales may support the
conclusion that the product created a risk of infringement.
Compound X's relative proportion of infringing and non-
infringing uses may also be taken into account. One method is to look
at the demographics of buyers of Seller B's purified Compound X. If
most of the buyers were pharmaceutical manufacturers and only few
of them were detergent manufacturers, it would indirectly indicate
that direct infringement of Patentee A's patent was a foreseeable
consequence of the sale of purified Compound X. But there may be
cases where such tracking of Seller B's products is impossible. In that
case, relative market sizes of the pharmaceuticals using Compound X
and the detergents using Compound X may provide one clue. If the
market of the pharmaceuticals using Compound X is substantially
larger than that of the detergent using Compound X, it may indirectly
imply that direct infringement was a foreseeable consequence from
the sale of Compound X.
Such quantitative comparison between the amount of infringing
use and the amount of non-infringing use is not foreign to the induced
infringement doctrine. In MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., a
copyright case, a survey identified that 75% of the files available
through the defendants' software were copyrighted works owned or
controlled by the plaintiffs and that 15% of the files were likely
copyrighted.9 As to the remaining 10% of the files, "there was not
enough information to form reasonable conclusions either as to what
those files even consisted of, and/or whether they were infringing or
non-infringing."' 93 With the survey data, Justice Ginsberg determined
that the defendants' software did not have substantial non-infringing
189. Id. at 1126.
190. Id. at 1130-31.
191. Id. at] 130.
192. 545 U.S. 913, 947 n.3 (2005) (Ginsberg J., concurring).
193. Id.
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uses because the "overwhelming" use of the software was for
infringement.'94 In foreseeability analysis, such circumstances will
strongly support a reasonable foreseeability of infringement.
The nature of direct infringers provides another clue regarding
foreseeability. In the above hypothetical, the direct infringers are
pharmaceutical companies who are making a pharmaceutical
composition containing Compound X. Pharmaceutical companies are
highly sophisticated parties, who usually have sufficient resources to
discover Patentee A's patent and sufficient bargaining and financial
power to seek authorization from Patentee A. Thus, it may not be a
foreseeable consequence that a pharmaceutical company produces
the patented composition without seeking a license from Patentee A.
On the other hand, if a patented invention is a method which the
general public can easily practice given adequate equipment, a seller
of the equipment may likely be subject to induced infringement
liability because it is unconceivable that each and every member of
the general public seeks authorization of the patent holder. In other
words, direct infringement by members of the general public is a
highly foreseeable consequence of selling the equipment. The tort
principle of strict product liability usually considers the user's ability
and awareness in determining whether the accused product has a
design defectj 95 and in induced infringement, a parallel analysis may
be used in determining whether an accused infringer created a risk of
direct infringement.
Induced infringement always involves a third party's direct
infringement, so the nature of the direct infringement must also be
considered in determining foreseeability. If the third party's activity
amounts to a superseding intervening force, it is beyond the
foreseeable consequences and thus breaks the chain of proximate
causation. For example, if Seller B sold purified Compound X which
by itself cannot be used in a pharmaceutical composition, and if
Buyer C converted the Compound X to Compound Y in order to
copy the patented composition, such conversion is probably beyond
reasonable anticipation and the infringement liability should solely be
194. Id.
195. In Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering Co., the New Jersey Supreme Court
endorsed Professor Wade's list factors in determining whether the product has a defect. 76
N.J. 152, 173 (1978) (citing John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liability for Products,
44 Miss L.J. 825 (1973)). The factors include "the user's ability to avoid danger by the
exercise of care in the use of the product" and "the user's anticipated awareness of the
dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability." Id. at 174.
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imposed on Buyer C. But if the Compound X is useless by itself and
its utility can only be attained by converting it to Compound Y, Buyer
C's conversion can hardly qualify as a superseding intervening force.
The key is whether such a conversion reasonably fits into the proper
use of Compound X. The inquiry conforms to the test of the misuse
doctrine in strict product liability.
In DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., the accused inducer (ITL)
sold a needle guard in its open-shell configuration; ITL had acquired
counsel's opinion of non-infringement.'96 The needle guard was
assembled in a foreign country into an infringing closed-shell
configuration, and the direct infringer (JMS) imported the closed-
shell needle guard into the United States.'9 The jury found ITL did
not have the requisite intent to cause infringement, and the Federal
Circuit upheld the district court's denial of the motion for new trial."'8
If the foreseeability analysis applies, the counsel's opinion is
irrelevant and the key question becomes whether the assembly into a
closed-shell configuration is objectively within the proper use of the
needle guard as ITL sold it.
Induced infringement may involve another third party who
imports and distributes the products to the United States. Seller B
may have sold its purified Compound X only in a foreign country, and
Buyer C may have purchased the Compound X from a distributor
who imported the Compound X into the United States. Now the
question is whether the distributor's activity constitutes a superseding
intervening force, and the answer will depend on the circumstances
surrounding the importation. If Seller B tightly confines its sale of
purified Compound X to a distributer who promises to resell it only in
the foreign country, it will be beyond reasonable expectation that the
distributer breaches the duty and imports Compound X into the
United States. In that case, Seller B may be off the hook because the
infringement in the United States is not a foreseeable consequence
from his sale of Compound X within the foreign country. On the
contrary, importation into the United States can hardly qualify as a
superseding intervening force if such importation is within the usual
and natural commercial flow of Compound X. For example, in
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., the accused inducer
supplied infringing products to various distributors who were
196. 471 F.3d 1293, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1307.
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conducting a significant amount of business in the United States.i99
Such circumstance may indicate that importation of the infringing
products into the United States was a foreseeable consequence from
the sale of the products. Thus, the accused inducer may be held liable
even if he sold the infringing products only within the foreign country.
IV. Conclusion
The specific intent requirement for § 271(b) should be abolished.
The language of § 271(b) does not provide any textual support for the
specific intent requirement. The specific intent requirement is
contrary to the early development of the case law before the
enactment of the 1952 Patent Act, which put no emphasis on the
mental state of a defendant. It is in conflict with many aspects of
patent law including the utilitarian policies, the doctrine of
equivalents and the basic risk allocation. Nor does the overlapping
scope of § 271(b) and § 271(c) necessitate the specific intent
requirement because Congress intended § 271(b) with its generic
language to cover a broader scope of indirect infringement than the
specific situation of § 271(c). Instead, inducement of § 271(b) should
be considered as a strict liability claim. The tort principles of strict
product liability and vicarious liability well support such strict liability
with overlapping policy considerations.
Proximate causation analysis from tort law betters fits the
induced infringement doctrine than the specific intent requirement.
Proximate causation analysis is well supported by the text of § 271(b).
It maintains the strict liability scheme of patent law intact and thus
avoids all the doctrinal and practical problems which the current
specific intent requirement causes. Proximate causation analysis
brings the extensive case law from tort law, which benefits parties,
courts and practitioners by providing sufficient authorities. Proximate
causation analysis is flexible enough to adequately safeguard against
over-expansion of the scope of inducement.
199. 131S. Ct. 2060,2064 (2011).
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